Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance

Saccades made during memory maintenance prioritize memory for the saccade target, but it is unclear if this benefit is specific to a location or extends across memorized objects. In three experiments, we examined whether saccadic selection spreads to other locations within the same object. In Experiment 1, we asked observers to remember three oriented Gabors presented either within contour-defined objects or without object structure. A subsequent movement cue prompted observers to move their eyes to the indicated location. We then probed memory for stimuli at locations equidistant from the saccade target, in either the same or a different object. Memory was best for stimuli at locations congruent with the saccade target, and consistently weaker for other stimuli presented in the same or a different object than the saccade target. In Experiment 2, we created more complex objects by adding more object features to the stimulus. Again, memory performance was best for stimuli congruent with the saccade target location, whereas memory in incongruent trials was worse and similar for stimuli in the same and different object as the saccade target. In Experiment 3, we tested if saccadic selection is present and propagates within the object in a change detection task. Again, memory performance (i.e., change detection) was best at the saccade target location. However, this memory benefit also spread to other locations within the same object. Our results imply that saccadic selection in visual working memory is primarily space-based but can also spread towards locations within the object where a saccade was directed.

Visual working memory (vWM) is often linked to conscious experience and visual imagery, but it is typically described as a system that stores separate, independent items. These assumptions are difficult to reconcile, given the unified nature of conscious experience. Here, we test the hypothesis that vWM relies on at least two distinct representations: an underlying, unconscious memory trace and a consciously accessible, integrated representation. A total of 216 participants performed a change-detection task, in which they rated their perceptual awareness of the memory display during the maintenance interval. Critically, we manipulated the statistical properties of the displays (average item size and size variability) to probe sensitivity to unified ensemble-level structure. Results revealed a dissociation between subjective and objective measures. Perceptual awareness increased for displays with larger, more variable items, whereas objective performance improved for displays with smaller, less variable items. Despite this difference, subjective awareness still predicted performance, and even incorrect responses showed consistent biases rather than random guesses. Importantly, individual differences in imagery vividness (VVIQ) were selectively associated with subjective awareness and estimation bias, but not with objective correctness. These precision biases were further shaped by display statistics, suggesting that multiple representations can guide behavior. Together, our findings support a reinterpretation of vWM performance in which task responses can draw on both unconscious and consciously accessible representations. One possible explanation for these behavioral patterns is that subjective experience reflects integrated, ensemble-like representations, while objective performance depends more strongly on item-specific information. Public significance statementsWorking memory allows us to temporarily hold and use information, and differences in this ability are closely linked to broader cognitive skills such as intelligence. This study shows that these differences may not depend only on how much information people can store, but also on how they experience it: some individuals appear to rely more on consciously accessible, image-like representations, especially when memory is uncertain or prone to error. By demonstrating that subjective experience and the vividness of imagery can shape behavior independently of objective accuracy, these findings suggest that how we use memory may be as important as how much we can store, with implications for understanding individual differences in cognition.

Humans rely on multiple sensory modalities, such as vision, audition, and touch, to perceive materials in everyday life. Previous research shows that multisensory perception leads to facilitation, yet the mechanisms responsible for this facilitation remain poorly understood. One potential mechanism is crossmodal prediction, whereby input from one modality generates predictions about another. While substantial research on multisensory facilitation has focused on bottom-up processes, such as spatial, temporal, and semantic congruency, the role of crossmodal predictions, particularly in material perception, has received little attention. To address this gap, we conducted two experiments, a reaction time task and a material rating task, in which participants viewed computer-generated animations of familiar objects being dropped to the ground. The paradigm exploited the natural temporal structure of impact events: pre-impact visual appearance provides information about an objects material and therefore can generate expectations about the forthcoming impact sound. Critically, participants saw the event only until before the impact, after which the video was masked. Thus, vision and audition were temporally aligned but not presented concurrently, allowing us to isolate the influence of visually driven expectations on the incoming auditory information without a bottom-up conflict. In some trials, the sound matched the expected material, but in a subset, it was incongruent, violating expectations elicited by the preceding visual information. Across both experiments, participants took longer to respond on incongruent than congruent trials, suggesting increased processing demands. In the rating task, incongruent trials also shifted material judgments, such that ratings reflected a weighted combination of incoming auditory information and visually driven predictions, with large individual differences in relative cue weighting. These findings suggest that priors on material properties from one modality, specifically vision, not only establish high-level expectations within the modality about an objects future state, but also extend across modalities.

Perception is typically biased towards prior expectations. In some cases, however, it seems repelled away from expectations, such that percepts appear less like what is expected. Even more intriguingly, separate studies have recently reported that predictions derived from gravity may shape perception in opposing ways. Specifically, gravity causes unsupported objects to accelerate downwards, leading to two predictions; that objects will move downwards (location prior) and at an increasing speed (acceleration prior). There is evidence that perceptual judgements are attracted towards location priors yet repelled from acceleration ones. Here we examine these effects in the same paradigm to determine whether they result from different types of stimuli and judgement, or more interestingly, might result from opposite influences of common predictive mechanisms influencing perception. We first replicate previous reports of a systematic bias to report upward moving objects as more accelerating than downward moving objects: effectively a repulsion from acceleration priors. We then show that the effect applies both at the level of retinal space and due to contextual cues concerning gravitational direction. Finally, we find that participants errors in a location reproduction task are similarly consistent with a repulsion from acceleration priors and, simultaneously, with an attraction towards location priors. We conclude by considering the ways in which these concurrent attractive and repulsive biases may reflect mechanisms optimising fast, accurate, and informative experiences in our ever-changing sensory world, therefore optimising the interface between perception and learning. Public Significance StatementIn a series of behavioural experiments, we show that expectations about how objects move due to gravity concurrently attract perception towards the prediction that objects move downwards, and repel perception away from the prediction that they do so at an increasing rate. These opposing influences inform current theories of perceptual processing, which explain how expectations may generate percepts that are fast, veridical, and informative.

Attentional control balances proactive suppression of predictable distractors with reactive suppression of unexpected ones. Yet, how internal states such as alertness shape this balance is unclear. Using pupillometry and eye tracking across two probability-cueing experiments (conducted in 2024) with varying distractor prevalence, we distinguished tonic (baseline pupil size across blocks) from trial-level pupil size fluctuations (trial-by-trial residual variability in pre-stimulus pupil size). With moderate prevalence, suppression of frequent-region distractors developed gradually, whereas high prevalence induced near-immediate suppression. Behavioral measures (e.g., reaction times) were closely linked to tonic and trial-level pupil size fluctuations. Critically, both alertness components jointly influenced control: during early learning, heightened trial-level pupil size increased distractor capture and reduced target fixations, whereas later on, suppression shifted to a proactive mode resilient to trial-level fluctuations. Under high prevalence, this shift occurred faster. Notably, higher trial-level pupil size generally accelerated first target selection. These findings show that tonic alertness and trial-level alertness fluctuations dynamically regulate reactive and proactive control during statistical learning. Impact StatementThis study shows that people become better at ignoring predictable distractions over time, but that this improvement depends not only on what they have learned about the task environment, but also on their current level of alertness. By combining eye tracking and pupil measures, we found that temporary increases in alertness can sometimes help people orient more quickly to relevant information, yet during earlier stages of learning they can also make attention more vulnerable to distracting events. These findings suggest that successful focus in complex environments depends on a dynamic interplay between learned expectations and moment-to-moment fluctuations in mental state, with implications for understanding sustained attention in settings such as monitoring, driving, and other tasks that require people to stay engaged while resisting distraction.

During active vision, the brain must coordinate where to move the eyes with predictions about upcoming sensory input. Before each saccade, perception is enhanced at the upcoming fixation location, but whether this enhancement depends on expectations about target features remains unknown. Here, participants prepared a saccade to a cued location while reporting the presence and orientation of a brief visual target that appeared either at the saccade goal or at the opposite location. Feature expectation was manipulated across blocks by varying the probability of the two target orientations. Perceptual sensitivity (d') increased when targets were presented at the saccade goal, consistent with presaccadic enhancement, and was also higher for less expected features. However, these effects were independent: feature probability did not alter the magnitude of presaccadic enhancement. Moreover, presaccadic enhancement increased near saccade onset, whereas the advantage for less expected features weakened as movement onset approached. Saccade latency revealed a contrasting pattern. Visual targets presented at the saccade goal delayed movement initiation. This delay depended on feature probability, with longer latencies for unexpected than for expected features only when saccades were directed towards the target. This location-specific effect persisted after accounting for perceptual report, and the latency cost for unexpected features was reproduced in a follow-up experiment. Together, these findings show that feature probability enhanced sensitivity to unexpected information independently of presaccadic enhancement, while selectively delaying saccade initiation towards targets with unexpected features. This dissociation suggests that feature expectation modulates perception and action through functionally distinct forms of visual processing.

Does attention operate within afterimages? Here we show that it does, using a novel pupillometry-based paradigm. Participants fixated centrally while bright and dark peripheral stimuli were presented, and a central cue directed attention to one of them. Over time, the stimuli perceptually faded due to adaptation and were then removed, leaving strong, negative afterimages. We found that pupil size tracked the brightness of the attended stimulus both during perceptual fading, when stimuli were present but perceptually weakened, and during perception of afterimages, when no physical stimuli were present. In the latter case, pupil size reflected the brightness of the negative afterimage rather than the preceding physical stimulus. This finding shows that covert attention can be directed within afterimages. More broadly, the results suggest that attention to afterimages bridges the gap between external and internal attention, challenging the notion of a strict dichotomy and supporting the view that this distinction is better understood as a continuum.

Social media users often feel that time vanishes while scrolling, but real feeds confound novelty, rewards, social signals, and self-paced control, leaving the driver of this distortion unclear. We tested whether self-paced visual exploration is sufficient to compress subjective time by comparing active scrolling with passive, yoked viewing and a static baseline. Twenty-three adults viewed sequences of natural images under three within-subject conditions: Scrolling (self-paced mouse clicks), Watching (a passive, yoked replay of their own scrolling sequence), and a Baseline (a static image). Participants estimated the elapsed duration of each block. Subjective duration was most compressed under Scrolling (48% of elapsed time), followed by Watching (51%) and Baseline (65%). Two sources separated these effects. Adding back the empty inter-image fixations brought the image-rich conditions to within seconds of the Baseline, showing that observers barely counted the blank gaps; the Scrolling--Watching difference, by contrast, was independent of these shared gaps, isolating self-paced control as a second source of compression. Electrophysiology linked that control to anticipatory neural states and the timing of early visual responses, with no amplified encoding of individual images. The results favor an attention-weighted account of timing, on which subjective duration tracks how much attention reaches the clock, a resource that a self-paced stream and its uncounted gaps both draw away.

Eye contact is one of the most potent social signals, but it remains unclear how little visual input is sufficient to register direct gaze, and whether such registration requires conscious awareness. Here, we used a custom tachistoscope to present faces for only 1-5 ms, asking whether gaze direction can shape perception at the very limits of vision. Direct-gaze faces required less visual input to localise than averted-gaze faces and produced higher localisation sensitivity from 3 ms onwards. Crucially, this advantage emerged before participants could explicitly categorise gaze direction, and before perceptual awareness ratings showed metacognitive access to the information driving localisation, both of which appeared only at 4-5 ms. Information-theoretic analyses confirmed that localisation responses carried stimulus-location information before explicit reports and awareness ratings became informative. A second experiment showed that the earliest eye-contact advantage depended mainly on low spatial frequencies, indicating a role for coarse visual information. Finally, autistic traits were associated with a reduced localisation advantage for direct gaze. These findings show that eye contact can influence perceptual processing within just a few milliseconds, with less visual stimulation than is required for conscious access to gaze direction.

Interception of moving objects requires the nervous system to compensate for sensory delays and uncertainty, yet how behavior is controlled remains debated. Key questions concern whether predictive processes play any role at all and, if so, whether they rely on simple motion extrapolation or incorporate internalized physical priors, such as gravity. Another open question is whether observers adopt a single control strategy or flexibly switch between predictive and reactive control - or between different predictive strategies - depending on task demands. To address these questions, we developed a virtual interception task in which participants intercepted moving targets under systematically varied conditions. We manipulated gravity (1g vs. 0g), visual availability (occluded vs. non-occluded), target velocity, and the initial spatial configuration of the ball and paddle (same vs. opposite side). Results indicate that interception is supported by predictive mechanisms across conditions. Behavioral patterns during occluded 0g trials suggest that participants extrapolate target motion using expectations consistent with gravity. Target velocity, visual occlusion, and task geometry modulated movement strategies, indicating that predictive control is flexibly adapted to task demands. These findings support the view that interception relies on predictive internal models incorporating structured physical priors while revealing flexible, context-dependent adaptations to sensory and task constraints.

Numerosity adaptation (the underestimation of number after exposure to a numerous adaptor) is reduced when adaptor and test differ in color, suggesting that the numerosity system parses items into color-defined categories. Here we ask whether this chromatic selectivity is organized into multiple narrowly tuned chromatic channels, and whether its expression depends on individual chromatic sensitivity. Twenty observers (aged 22-61) completed two psychophysical tasks. First, chromatic discrimination was measured for five hues spaced in 5{degrees} CIE L*a*b* steps ({Delta}H = 0{degrees}, 5{degrees}, 10{degrees}, 15{degrees}, 20{degrees}) from a red reference (LCh: 54, 118, 38), yielding an individual just-noticeable difference (JND). Second, numerosity adaptation was measured across the same five chromatic distances between a 48-dot adaptor and the test. Observers with superior discrimination (JND < 2.5{degrees}) showed robust chromatic tuning, adaptation declining as the test moved away from the adaptor hue, whereas poorer discriminators showed none. Using an interindividual-covariance / factor-analytic approach, we found that adaptation strengths at neighboring chromatic distances were highly correlated and fell off with chromatic separation. Principal component analysis extracted two factors, one loading on the larger chromatic distances and one on the smaller; under oblique (promax) rotation the two factors were substantially correlated (r = .66), implying at least two dissociable but overlapping chromatically tuned mechanisms. These results suggest that numerosity adaptation is mediated by multiple, comparatively narrow chromatic channels, resembling the higher-order color mechanisms inferred from color scaling, SSVEP, and fMRI, rather than the two early cardinal axes (L-M, S-(L+M)).

Memorizing a new phone number or address is hard at first, but becomes easier with repetition, as information shifts from working memory to long-term memory. Here we investigated how repetition affects the storage and transition of different aspects of mnemonic information by comparing univariate neural markers of active object storage with multivariate decoding of memory content. Thirty participants encoded lateralized stimuli from a continuous shape space into memory. Memory items were repeated six times in a row to induce learning. In line with earlier work, EEG recordings revealed that repetition led to a reduction in contralateral delay activity (CDA), a measure of active storage that has been taken to reflect a pointer-like representation of the individual object or its original source. In contrast, shape decoding during the retention and also after an impulse perturbation remained constant across repetitions. These results suggest that learning over repetitions reflects the abolishment of active and individuated object memory representations while passive, source-independent memory representations are retained.

The ability to orient or attend to sensory events is generally greater in response to visual and auditory cues occurring together than in response to single-modality cues occurring alone. In such cases the perceptual fusion of cross-modal stimuli (multisensory integration) depends on low-level features (e.g., location, intensity) and follows well established principles. However, less is known about multisensory integration mechanisms when behavioral responses are less direct and require top-down control. Here we investigate this in human participants using an urgent multisensory choice task that effectively dissociates stimulus-driven and goal-driven contributions to performance based on their distinct temporal signatures. Task conditions varied the modality of the cues (auditory, visual, or both), their location (left or right), and the rule defining the correct choice (look toward or away from a given cue). When spatially coincident cues were associated with the same response rule ("look away"), we observed multisensory enhancement and performance remained close to a statistical expectation as the choice process unfolded. However, when spatially disparate cues were associated with different rules but the same target, one cue dominated performance and the other produced crossmodal capture, i.e., low-level competition. The results indicate that the efficacy of multisensory integration is dictated by the stimulus-and goal-driven signals produced by each cue, with all four factors rapidly interacting in accordance to the dynamics of spatial attention. Significance StatementAuditory and visual stimuli located near each other in space and time are typically bound into a single sensory percept that draws attention most effectively. However, it is unclear whether such "multisensory integration" occurs during behaviors that go beyond directly attending or orienting to cue stimuli and require top-down control. We investigated this using a novel task design with which stimulus-driven and goal-driven contributions to performance can be accurately identified. We found that multisensory enhancement depends not so much on the complexity of the requested cue-response associations, but rather on the timing and alignment of the stimulus-and goal-driven signals derived from each cue (auditory and visual) -- similar to the way that such signals dictate the allocation of spatial attention.

Children often outperform adults in probabilistic statistical learning tasks, yet the mechanisms underlying this developmental advantage remain poorly understood. Here, we used eye-tracking measures of belief updating to examine how children and adults acquire and update predictions in a probabilistic sequence-learning task. Using the standard (oculomotor) reaction time measure, children showed stronger statistical learning than adults, replicating previous behavioral findings while revealing a more detailed profile of developmental differences in statistical learning. Critically, children updated their predictions more frequently: they were less likely to repeat previous predictions and more likely to shift their expectations in response to new input. Adults, in contrast, showed greater persistence, tending to maintain prior predictions even when those predictions were inconsistent with the underlying statistical structure. Despite these pronounced differences in updating behavior, the processing and use of prediction errors were remarkably similar across age groups. These findings indicate that developmental differences in statistical learning do not primarily arise from how prediction errors are computed, but rather from how prior beliefs and incoming information are weighted during belief updating. Children's enhanced learning may therefore reflect reduced reliance on stable priors and greater sensitivity to current sensory evidence, supporting a more exploratory learning strategy. Adults, by contrast, appear to favor an exploitative strategy that stabilizes existing predictions but reduces flexibility in probabilistic environments. More broadly, the results suggest that developmental changes in statistical learning may reflect age-related differences in how readily learners revise their predictions in response to incoming evidence. By integrating sensitive oculomotor measures with analyses that probe the mechanisms underlying belief updating, the present study provides a more fine-grained account of how predictive learning changes across development and offers a framework for reconciling previously inconsistent developmental findings in statistical learning.

Many forms of memory are thought to rely on visual imagery, but individuals who report lacking visual imagery (aphantasia) can still perform various memory tasks. There is, however, evidence that aphantasia may lead to less detailed autobiographical memories, suggesting there may be deficits in the underlying cognitive processes that support personal memories. One such process is associative memory, which requires binding of different types of information. Here, we tested whether associative visual memory is intact in aphantasia. We assessed 72 self-identified individuals with aphantasia and 77 controls who reported having visual imagery. Participants completed an associative memory task which involved memorising displays where a unique object in a specific location was associated with a particular colour fixation point. Individuals with aphantasia performed equivalently to controls for object locations and outperformed controls on the associated object-identity. In addition, whereas controls were significantly worse at remembering associated object-identity than object-location, individuals with aphantasia showed no such difference. Both groups showed good metacognitive performance evidenced by a positive correlation between confidence and accuracy; there were no significant differences in confidence between the groups. Reported strategies varied between groups: a large proportion of control participants reported using visual imagery and self-reported use of imagery positively correlated with performance. Conversely, individuals with aphantasia mostly reported using nonvisual strategies to remember the associations. Overall, the findings suggest that individuals with aphantasia can form associative memories using nonvisual strategies. Thus, difficulties with autobiographical memory in aphantasia seem unlikely to be due to fundamental issues with associative memory.

The ability to mentally rotate objects is a fundamental feature of human cognition, and humans can use this ability to make choices about objects based on their geometry. However, remarkably little is known about how such choices are reached, and what sort of visual information might facilitate them. We devised an experiment where participants had to mentally simulate an object's rotation to choose which of two objects was better for a subsequent task based on its shape alone. We also tracked their gaze while they made their choice, to see which visual information they were using to facilitate this mental simulation. We found that participants were consistently able to choose the most suitable object for the task, and, remarkably, the visual information they sampled was directly linked to their choices. Put simply, participants made better choices when they looked at more informative regions of the objects, and participants who sampled regions that were better for facilitating mental simulation made better choices overall. These findings reveal a direct link between fixations, simulation, and decision-making, suggesting that to perform any fine-grained mental simulation people need to direct their gaze at specific, informative points of an object to simulate its two-dimensional proximal image displacement.

Cognitive maps encode spatial relationships between locations and support flexible navigation. However, how these mental representations form in the absence of visual experience remains unclear. Here, we introduce a multisensory virtual navigation paradigm that allows to track the temporal dynamics of non-visual cognitive map formation. Sixteen early blind (EB), 17 late blind (LB), and 29 sighted controls (SC) learned the layout of a tactile maze. Participants repeatedly performed virtual pointing (estimating directions between locations) and navigation (reaching locations) tasks, which measured cognitive maps across multiple stages of learning. This method also enabled algorithmic inference of cognitive maps, providing insights into how mental distortions are progressively corrected. Although there were no group differences in average navigation performance, EB showed slower knowledge accumulation compared to LB and SC. In addition, both EB and LB had difficulties translating cognitive maps into first-person perspectives, resulting in reduced pointing and cognitive map accuracy. Yet, cognitive map accuracy improved progressively in all groups and a subset of EB and LB achieved expert-level performance with high navigation and pointing precision. In sum, this study provides a scalable framework for tracking alterations in cognitive map formation in blindness and other neurological conditions. Importantly, it demonstrates that cognitive map formation in the absence of vision is experience-dependent and trainable. Spatial disadvantages often observed in EB and LB thus do not reflect cognitive deficits but result from adaptive behavioral strategies constraining the use of allocentric cognitive maps.

Real-world distractors occur in environments whose states change at different rates. We asked whether such volatility alters early attentional gating or instead changes the criterion for committing to a response. Observers performed an additional-singleton search task with concurrent eye tracking while distractor presence followed high- or low-volatility sequences, with overall distractor prevalence held constant. Trial-pooled oculomotor capture was higher under high volatility, a pattern that appears to indicate altered filtering. That inference did not survive repetition-aware analysis: once the same-location run position was matched, capture did not detectably differ across volatility regimes. The pooled capture effect was therefore consistent with a structural consequence of the volatility manipulation, which enriched high-volatility blocks with early-run positions where capture is intrinsically high. The positive volatility signature appeared on distractor-absent trials, where high-volatility blocks were associated with longer target latency, more fixations, longer final-target dwell, and fewer errors. Same-location repetition learning showed no detectable difference in slope across regimes. A hierarchical drift-diffusion model (DDM) and a complementary volatility Kalman-filter (VKF) dynamic-state comparison indicated that manual responses were better described by architectures that allow both boundary-related and drift-related components than by a boundary-only account. Volatility, therefore, did not show detectable evidence of impairing the local gating rule; instead, the converging evidence points to a post-selective verification/caution profile, consistent with a precision-weighted read-out of environmental uncertainty.

Goal-directed behavior often requires sustained effort across a sequence of interdependent decisions, yet the determinants of persistence in such contexts remain poorly understood. Here, we investigated how individuals regulate persistence in a novel sequential effort-based task in which they controlled an avatar through successive checkpoints to reach a final goal and could make repeated attempts following failure. At each attempt, participants could choose either to persist in the same task or to disengage toward an easier but less rewarding alternative. We found that decisions to persist or disengage were jointly shaped by multiple interacting factors. Disengagement increased with task difficulty and lower skill level. It also increased with repeated attempts and time-on-task, indexing fatigue, and with accumulated errors, indexing lack of progress. Conversely, proximity to the goal promoted persistence and shaped decision dynamics by reducing choice conflict during persistence decisions and increasing hesitation during disengagement near the goal. Notably, clearing the first checkpoint produced a sharp increase in persistence, suggesting that early success plays a pivotal role. Furthermore, persistence reflected both retrospective and prospective evaluations of effort, with prior investment promoting commitment and anticipated effort reducing it. Finally, disengagement was preceded by short-term performance decline but not by gradual increases in decision conflict, suggesting relatively abrupt strategy shifts following repeated failures. Together, these findings provide a comprehensive account of persistence in sequential effortful tasks, showing that decisions to persist or disengage are jointly shaped by multiple factors related to fatigue, (lack of) progress, goal proximity, and early success.

Previous research suggests that humans are extremely sensitive to object-directed eye gaze, which effectively guides their attention toward objects of shared interest. This contrasts with non-human primates, who typically require much more salient eye-gaze cues to achieve comparable attentional orienting. However, it remains unclear whether cross-species differences in ocular morphology account for this performance gap. To address this question, we examined humans covert shifts of spatial attention in response to eye-gaze cues provided by either realistic human or rhesus monkey head avatars. Target detection was reliably enhanced on gaze-congruent compared to gaze-incongruent trials, with comparable gaze-cueing effects for both avatar types, despite the fact that monkey eyes lack many of the conspicuous features characteristic of human eyes. Hence, eye morphology alone does not substantially modulate gaze-driven attentional orienting in humans, whereas humans reliable use of monkey eye-gaze cues highlights a clear species difference in perceptual sensitivity to eye gaze signals. Significance StatementEye-gaze-mediated attentional orienting is a conserved ability across primates, yet sensitivity to subtle eye-gaze cues may differ between species. Here, we provide empirical evidence that humans exhibit a quantitatively greater capacity than non-human primates to follow subtle eye-gaze cues. Importantly, we showed that this difference cannot be attributed to species-specific ocular morphology as human participants showed robust and comparable reflexive attentional orienting to both human and rhesus monkey eye-gaze cues. This is striking given the pronounced differences in ocular morphology and coloration/contrast between the two species. These findings suggest that cross-species diversity in extracting spatial information from eye-gaze cues likely reflects differences in perceptual sensitivity rather than bottom-up constraints imposed by species-specific ocular morphology.